This commentary was first published on the Foreign Policy magazine website on Feb. 2, 2011.
The nationwide decline in housing prices that began in 2006 was supposed to be, we were told, impossible. Because its impact was limited initially to the sub-prime mortgage market, which was a relatively small part of the overall home-mortgage market, policy makers at the Department of the Treasury and the Federal Reserve assured us that its effects would be contained. That prediction, we now know, turned out to be horribly wrong.
So, too, the revolutions in Tunisia and Egypt were said to be impossible. Even after the shocking events of Tunisia, pundits were quick to deny their relevance to Egypt. Egypt was a much larger country; its population was less educated, less politically savvy, and too habitually passive to become revolutionary; moreover, Egypt's security service was much larger and tougher than those of Tunisia, and in any event the Egyptian military could be relied upon to come quickly to the aid of the regime in the event of any crisis. Indeed, some pundits were quick to dismiss Tunisians entirely from the Arab world.