LAW & ECONOMICS WORKSHOP
presents
Professor Matthew Stephenson
Harvard Law School
Does Separation of Powers Promote Stability and Moderation?
Tuesday, October 9, 2012
4:10 – 6:00
Solarium (room FA2) – Falconer Hall
84 Queen’s Park
It is often asserted that separation of legislative powers tends to make legislation both more moderate (because concessions to all veto players are needed to secure enactment) and less frequent (because sufficient concessions are sometimes infeasible). The formal analysis in this paper shows this claim to be incomplete, and often incorrect. Although greater separation of powers makes legislation more difficult to enact, it also makes legislation, once enacted, more difficult to repeal. Attenuating the threat of repeal means that when one faction has sufficient power to push through extreme policies, it is more likely to do so than would be the case if legislative power were more concentrated. These two effects cut in opposite directions, and it is difficult to say, as a general matter, which will predominate. Indeed, increasing the fragmentation of legislative power may sometimes increase both the expected frequency and the expected extremism of legislative enactments.
Matthew Stephenson is Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, where he teaches administrative law, legislation and regulation, and political economy of public law. His research focuses on the application of positive political theory to public law, particularly in the areas of administrative procedure, judicial institutions, and separation of powers. Prior to joining the Harvard Law School faculty, Professor Stephenson clerked for Senior Judge Stephen Williams on the D.C. Circuit and for Justice Anthony Kennedy on the Supreme Court. He received his J.D. and Ph.D. (political science) from Harvard in 2003, and his B.A. from Harvard College in 1997.
For more workshop information, please contact Nadia Gulezko at n.gulezko@utoronto.ca.
